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Abstract
The paper develops a unified general equilibrium model including savings
with overlapping generations, investment and search unemployment.
Long-run analytical results for the small open economy identify capital
accumulation as a prime transmission channel. The effects of integration
on unemployment, however, depend importantly on the nature of wage
taxation and unemployment compensation. As a separate methodological
contribution, we extend a dynamic CGE model for Germany to allow for
search unemployment of high- and low-skilled labour. Simulating the
effects of Eastern EU enlargement, we find quantitatively small effects of
integration but more pronounced labour market effects from immigration.
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With the advent of free trade areas spanning high and low wage countries, and global-
ization of the world economy in general, economicts started to debate intensively over
the eﬀects of trade and integration on labour markets in industrialized economies. The
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the upcoming Eastern enlargement to
the European Union (EU) both caused much concern over the eﬀects on wages and em-
ployment in the rich, industrialized countries. While in North America the attention
focuses primarily on relative wages, Europe with its rigid labour markets is concerned
more with unemployment. In particular, high unemployment among low-skilled workers
feeds deep reservations against Eastern EU enlargement. A related and even more hotly
debated issue is immigration which directly adds to aggregate labour supply and might
partly crowd out domestic workers or reduce their wages.1 Free movement of labour be-
longs to the basic principles of the EU. In Germany, the problem is particularly acute
since millions of ethnic Germans still live in Eastern European countries. Germany most
probably would attract a large part of Eastern immigrants.
T h et r a d el i t e r a t u r ed e a l tw i t ht h ec a s eo ft a r i ﬀs as a second-best instrument to
address labour market distortions such as minimum wages or workers’ unionization [see
Rama (1997), or the partial equilibrium analysis of Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991)].
Rama (1997) pointed out that the argument depends on the particular labour market
institutions in place. Nation-wide unions tend to favour wage moderation since they
largely internalize the eﬀects of their actions. In contrast, decentralized wage bargaining
restricts employment in the unionized sector, but protection could expand labour demand
again to restore employment at the eﬃcient level [see also Rama and Tabellini (1998) in
a political economy context]. Unemployment, however, is not explicitly modeled since all
excess labour is absorbed by a perfectly competitive export sector, or agriculture. Davis
(1998a,b) pointed to the importance of diﬀering labour market institutions in explaining
the diverging eﬀects of trade and technological progress on relative wages and employment
1Razin and Sadka (1992) discuss beneﬁts and costs of migration and its relationship with trade.
1in Europe and the U.S. In particular, he compared the eﬀects of ﬂexible and ﬁxed minimum
wages for (un-)employment of unskilled workers in Europe. The trade literature, however,
has largely neglected the analysis of integration and unemployment in explicitly dynamic
models with capital accumulation [Matusz (1996), Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999)
and Jansen and Turrini (2000) discuss trade in search and eﬃciency wage models without
capital accumulation]. Relying on a search-theoretic framework, this paper emphasizes
capital accumulation as a prime transmission mechanism, arguing that integration aﬀects
unemployment mainly by stimulating investment.
In line with the empirical evidence by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), a large part of
the literature emphasizes job creation and job destruction as a principal source of un-
employment. The core theory along these lines are the models of search unemployment
pioneered by Diamond (1982), Pissarides (1990), Hosios (1990) and Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994) which spawned a proliﬁc theoretical and empirical literature [see Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999) for a survey]. It has proved diﬃcult to integrate the theory of search
unemployment with meaningful models of savings and investment. When individual un-
employment spells are stochastic, agents become heterogeneous with respect to their past
unemployment and savings history. In the absence of a tractable aggregation procedure,
an income pooling assumption is unavoidable. The literature on growth and unemploy-
ment [e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1994)] and on real business cycles [e.g. Andolfatto (1996),
Merz (1999), Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (1997), and Shi and Wen (1997, 1999)]
adopts such an assumption of perfect insurance and income pooling within the extended
family. This approach opens up the way to combine the search model with capital accu-
mulation and allows to address the consequences of unemployment for average income and
macroeconomic equilibrium. With the few exceptions noted above, the growing literature
on search unemployment has not found its way into trade theory.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we study the eﬀects of integration
and immigration in a small open economy with capital accumulation and search unem-
ployment. As it turns out, the eﬀects of integration on unemployment depend importantly
2on ﬁscal policy rules relating to unemployment beneﬁts and wage taxation. We also show
how the welfare gains from integration depend on labour market imperfections. Second,
we merge search unemployment with an overlapping generations model as in Blanchard
(1985), allowing demographics and population dynamics to inﬂuence the unemployment
rate. We ﬁnd that immigration may have important transitional eﬀects on unemployment
that depend on the age structure of immigrants. Third, as a separate methodological
contribution, we extend a numerically solved, dynamic general equilibrium model of the
German economy [see Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg and Kohler (2000)] by including search
unemployment, separately for high- and low-skilled labour. This is the ﬁrst computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model of this kind. We apply it to obtain quantitative results
on labour market and general equilibrium eﬀects in Germany, resulting from Eastern en-
largement of the EU. We ﬁnd that the quantitative eﬀects of integration on unemployment
are relatively modest while immigration can give rise to more pronounced labour market
eﬀects. The paper develops the model in section 2 together with an analysis of the eﬃ-
ciency properties of the market equilibrium.2 Section 3 derives basic analytical results,
and section 4 proceeds with quantifying the eﬀects of Eastern enlargement, including
immigration. Section 5 oﬀers a brief summary and some conclusions.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Households
We extend an overlapping generations model pioneered by Blanchard (1985) by incorpo-
rating search unemployment and immigration. At each instant of time a large number of
identical “families” or “dynasties” is born. Each dynasty counts inﬁnitely many members
who practice income pooling. Regardless of age, dynasties face a constant probability
of extinction. To keep the population constant, the number of new dynasties is exactly
2More details are given in a separate Mathematical Appendix which is available on request.
3matched by the number of deaths. Immigration, however, makes the population expand
in ways that depend on the speciﬁc assumptions regarding mortality and arrival rates.
2.1.1 Individual Dynasties
Ad y n a s t yc o n s i s t so fi n ﬁnitely many members with mass one. Members care only about
lifetime utility of the dynasty. Individual labour income risk is fully insured within the
dynasty, or household. Thus, household income is non-stochastic.3 Expected lifetime






where β is the instantaneous probability of death (β ≥ 0), ρ i st h ep u r er a t eo ft i m e
preference (ρ > 0)a n dCv,τ is consumption of a composite good including domestic
and foreign commodities. The instantaneous utility function satisﬁes Φ0 > 0 > Φ00 and
limC→0 Φ0 =+ ∞ as usual. The dynasty’s time endowment equal to unity is allocated to
work (Lv,τ)a n dj o bs e a r c h( Uv,τ):
Uv,τ + Lv,τ = 1. (2)
At each instant of time, idiosyncratic shocks destroy a constant proportion of the pre-
existing matches between ﬁrms and workers. Part of the employed lose their jobs while
unemployed household members ﬁnd employment. Given a matching rate fτ,e q u a lt o
the fraction of unemployed individuals ﬁnding a job, and an exogenous job destruction
rate s,4 and deﬁning ˙ Lv,τ ≡ dLv,τ/dτ, the stock of employed agents evolves according to5
˙ Lv,τ ≡ fτUv,τ − sLv,τ. (3)
3See Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1999), Galí (1996), Den Haan et al.(1997), and Shi and Wen (1997,1999).
4At the cost of further complexity, we could make the job destruction rate endogenous as in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994, 1999). While none of the qualitative results hinge on this, the eﬀects on unemploy-
ment would be magniﬁed, see also Jansen and Turrini (2000).
5Lang, Palivos and Wang (1995) oﬀer an overlapping generations model where workers, after an initial
schooling eﬀort, search for jobs. Once a job is found, workers remain employed during their entire lifetime.
Our framework, in contrast, allows for repeated unemployment spells.
4Dynasties face a budget identity
˙ Av,τ ≡ (r + β)Av,τ + W
∗
τ Lv,τ + B
U
τ Uv,τ + Tτ − Cv,τ, (4)
where ˙ Av,τ ≡ dAv,τ/dτ, Av,τ stands for a stock of tangible assets yielding a real interest of
r, W ∗
τ is the after-tax wage rate, BU
τ is the unemployment beneﬁt, and Tτ is a lump-sum
transfer per capita, or tax if it is negative. These variables are deﬁn e di nr e a lt e r m s ,
i.e. in units of the composite good.6 The dynasty purchases (reverse) life insurance in
the form of actuarially fair annuities. These annuities yield βAv,τ during lifetime but, in
exchange, the dynasty must cede the entire estate to the life insurance company upon
death. Below we shall refer to r + β as the annuity rate of interest. Finally, we assume
the existence of a dual income tax. While capital income is taxed proportionally, wage










where Wτ is the gross real wage and tL is the marginal wage tax rate. Given a basic tax
credit equal to BL
τ , an employed agent runs up a tax liability of tLWτ −BL
τ . Alternatively,
BL
τ may be understood as an employment subsidy.
The household maximizes lifetime utility (1) by choosing time paths of consump-
tion, search time and tangible assets subject to the accumulation identities (3)—(4) and
a solvency condition. The initial stocks Av,t and Lv,t are taken as given. With details
spelled out in a separate Mathematical Appendix, the key conditions characterizing opti-
mal household behaviour are:
˙ Cv,τ = Cv,τσ (r − ρ), (6)






















(r + β + s)dµ
¸
dτ, (8)
6Its price index P
¡
ph,p m¢
reﬂects prices ph and pm of home goods and imports. We choose the import
good as the numeraire and normalize its world market price to unity. The interest parity condition
r = i − ˙ P/P ties the domestic real interest to the world interest rate i. If the home country is small,
goods prices and the world interest rate are exogenously given and constant, implying r = i.
5where σ ≡− Φ0/(CΦ00) is the (constant) intertemporal substitution elasticity for con-
sumption. The shadow price λ
L
t reﬂects the pecuniary value of an additional member
taking up a job at time t a n di se q u a lt ot h ee x p e c t e dp r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h e“ d i v i d e n d ”
earned on the job. The job dividend reﬂects the excess of the after-tax wage over the
reservation wage which is the unemployment beneﬁt plus the expected gain from ﬁnding
employment somewhere else. Apart from the mortality rate β, the instantaneous discount
rate also reﬂects the risk of job separation. According to (6), agents optimally postpone
consumption to the future when the real interest exceeds the pure rate of time preference.
The closed-form solution (7) shows that the household consumes a constant proportion
¯ c of its total wealth.7 Human wealth and the annuity value of lump-sum transfers are

















Higher unemployment subtracts from average human wealth. The dynasty thus attaches
ad i ﬀerential value λ
L
t to an additional member switching from search to employment.
Appendix A shows how human wealth may be written in terms of shadow prices.
2.1.2 Aggregate Household Sector
At each instant of time, a number Nt,t of new dynasties arrive, and mortality eliminates
af r a c t i o nβ of the existing population. The population thus evolves as ˙ Nt = Nt,t − βNt.
With constant population, births must balance with deaths, Nt,t = βNt. Frequencies and
probabilities coincide when numbers are large. Since the death rate is constant among all
dynasties, the cohort size of generation v at time t is Nv,t ≡ Nv,veβ(v−t) (t ≥ v). Adding
up gives a total population of Nt ≡
R t
−∞ Nv,tdv dynasties. Deﬁne aggregate variables
as xt ≡
R t
−∞ xv,tNv,veβ(v−t)dv, implying ˙ xt = xt,tNt,t − βxt +
R t
−∞ ˙ xv,tNv,veβ(v−t)dv.T h e
Mathematical Appendix derives a number of key expressions that characterize aggregate
household sector behaviour. Assuming that new dynasties are born bare of any assets
7The marginal propensity to consume ¯ c is constant if the real interest rate is ﬁxed.
6(At,t =0 ), we ﬁrst aggregate (4) across all generations:
˙ At ≡ rAt + W
∗
t Lt + B
U
t Ut + TtNt − Ct. (10)
Aggregate savings attract the market interest rate rather than the annuity rate. Insurance
payments βAt merely redistribute death estates to surviving dynasties and therefore cancel
out in the aggregate savings identity.
Second, the overall population splits into Lt + Ut = Nt from (2). New dynasties are
assumed to start life without a job (Ut,t = 1 and Lt,t =0 ). Individual job accumulation
(3) thus implies aggregate labour market ﬂows
˙ Lt = ftUt − (s + β)Lt, ˙ Ut = Nt,t + sLt − (ft + β)Ut. (11)
Employment expands as unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs, and it falls either because jobs
are destroyed (at rate s) or workers die (at rate β). Using Lt + Ut = Nt and ˙ Nt =
Nt,t − βNt, unemployment dynamics just mirrors the evolution of employment. The
ﬂow into unemployment results from the arrival of new dynasties and the destruction of
existing jobs, whereas the ﬂow out of unemployment consists of workers ﬁnding a job
or dying. Without loss of generality, we may assume that population size is unity prior
to an immigration shock (Nt = 1). In the absence of migration, levels and rates of
(un-)employment thus coincide.
2.2 Firms
The production structure rests on two types of perfectly competitive ﬁrms. Investment
ﬁrms accumulate physical capital. Production ﬁrms use labour and rent capital services
to produce a homogeneous good. The output price is taken as given in world markets.
Both types of ﬁrms are owned by domestic households.
72.2.1 Investment Firms
The investment ﬁrm purchases Iτ units of the composite good and builds up a stock of
capital Kτ subject to the accumulation constraint
˙ Kτ = Iτ − δKτ, (12)












where tK is the tax rate on capital income and Rτ is the real rental rate of capital,
measured in units of the composite good. In equilibrium, investment equates the marginal




Rτ = r + δ. (14)
2.2.2 Production Firms
While there are many production ﬁrms, each one is assumed large enough to have de-
terministic ﬂows relating to its total labour force. Even though hiring of and separation
from individual workers is stochastic, these risks wash out over the ﬁrm’s total labour
force as in Pissarides (1990). The ﬁrm loses a given proportion of its workforce either
due to idiosyncratic shocks or due to death of agents (see also (11)a b o v e ) .T oﬁnd new
workers, it must post a suﬃcient number of vacancies V :
˙ Lτ = qτVτ − (s + β)Lτ, (15)
where q is the instantaneous probability of successful hiring. To ﬁnd new workers, the
ﬁrm must allocate part of its pre-existing workforce to search and recruitment activities.
Each vacancy requires a labour input of κ for search activities.8 The representative ﬁrm is
8This formulation of search costs is required to reconcile the search framework with the multisectoral
structure of the simulation model.
8perfectly competitive and uses a linearly homogeneous production technology to produce









τ = Lτ − κVτ. (16)
















τ is the relative price of the domestic good and Pτ the price index for the composite
good. The ﬁrm chooses time paths for output, capital rentals, vacancies and employment
in order to maximize (17) subject to the production function (16) and the accumulation
identity for workers (15), taking as given its initial labour force Lt. The Mathematical



























Capital is rented until the marginal value product of capital is equal to its rental rate
as in (18). According to (19), the ﬁrm posts new vacancies until the marginal cost of
recruitment per worker in terms of foregone output equals the expected value of that
worker. The value of a ﬁlled job in (20) is the expected present value of the rent which
the ﬁrm earns on that job. The instantaneous discount rate also reﬂects the risk of job
termination due to death, β, and separation for other reasons, s.
2.3 Wage Bargaining
Vacancies and searching workers participate in an anonymous matching process. With U
unemployed workers and V vacancies, the number of contacts at each instant of time is
Xτ = G(Uτ,V τ), (21)
9where G(·) is linearly homogeneous and satisﬁes the usual Inada-style properties. Deﬁning
labour market tightness as θ ≡ V/U we derive:
f (θτ) ≡ Xτ/Uτ,q (θτ) ≡ Xτ/Vτ. (22)
The properties of the matching function imply f = θq, f0 > 0 >f 00,a n dq0 < 0 <q 00.
We deﬁne ² as the elasticity of the function q(θ), i.e. 0 <²≡− θq0(θ)/q(θ) < 1, implying
that 1 −² is the elasticity of the f(θ) function. Henceforth, we specialize, without loss of
generality, to X = x0U²V 1−² and thereby take the elasticity to be constant.
Following Pissarides (1990), we assume that the two parties share the job rent created
by a new match according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. When they agree
on a higher wage, the job value to the worker (8) rises while the job value to the ﬁrm









¤1−ζ,w h e r eζ and 1−ζ are the bargaining weights of workers and









t and results in
an e tw a g e(1 − tL)Wt = ζ(1 − tL)ph




t ). The wage is a
weighted average of the marginal value product of the job net of the wage tax and the
worker’s outside option which is the unemployment beneﬁt [less the employment subsidy]
plus the expected gain from ﬁnding a job elsewhere. With a larger bargaining power, the
worker appropriates more of the surplus. Using the bargaining solution again, we obtain:








1 − tL + ζ ·
ftµL
t
1 − tK. (23)
2.4 Equilibrium
In the absence of public debt, the government budget identity is given by:
TtNt + B
U
















where TE represents net contributions to the European Union (EU). Revenues stem from
a dual (capital and labour) income tax, and are spent on unemployment beneﬁts, transfers
to the household sector and net EU contributions.9
9The simulation model also includes tariﬀ revenues plus more taxes, spending items and public debt.
10Households invest savings in three perfectly substitutable assets. Asset market equi-




t ,w h e r eAI and AP are, respectively, shares in investment and pro-














where the term in brackets is the trade balance. Net exports are equal to domes-
tic real income less absorption. The transversality condition for the entire economy is
limτ→∞ er(t−τ)AF















To the extent that the country is a net creditor to the rest of the world (AF
t > 0)i tc a n
aﬀord to run current account deﬁcits in the future.
Replacing I by ˙ K + δK and integrating by parts, equation (26) yields the present
value of consumption,
R ∞
0 Cτer(t−τ)dτ = AF














Net contributions, in real terms, amount to TE = tEphY/P where tE is the net contri-
bution rate. Given a constant real interest rate, and ignoring issues of intergenerational
redistribution, we can take the present value of domestic consumption as our aggregate
welfare measure. Welfare changes along with Λ∗ since K0 + AF
0 is predetermined.10
2.5 Eﬃciency
To characterize eﬃciency of the market equilibrium, appendix B considers the socially
optimal allocation. Comparing (B.1)w i t h( 14) and (18) implies tK =0for optimality.
Private investment decisions are socially optimal if they are not distorted by capital taxa-
tion. Due to search externalities and non-competitive wage setting, however, recruitment
10In the absence of adjustment costs, the domestic capital stock may jump instantaneously which is
ﬁnanced by an asset swap with foreign bonds, keeping K0 + AF
0 constant.
11of ﬁrms and search activities of households are not optimal in general. Since the opportu-
nity costs of recruitment in (B.3) and (19) are the same, the number of privately posted
vacancies is optimal if social and private job values, µ and µL,s a t i s f y
(1 − ²)µ = µ
L. (28)
In taking the probability q as given, private ﬁrms expect to successfully hire q workers per
vacancy announced. In equilibrium, however, the number of matches G = Vq(θ) depends
on labour market tightness. Posting a new vacancy contributes to tighter labour markets.
Other ﬁrms will thus ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to ﬁll their own vacancies while workers will
obtain jobs more easily, f0 (θ) > 0 >q 0(θ).I n s t e a d o f q workers, ﬁrms in fact will be
able to hire only (1 − ²)q workers per vacancy announced. Since ﬁrms fail to take into
account this detrimental eﬀect on labour market tightness, they tend to post too many
vacancies. This externality could be internalized if the private value of a job µL were
reduced below the social value µ by a factor 1−² that corresponds to the reduction in the
hiring probability in equilibrium. Appendix B shows that this can be achieved if ﬁscal
policy suitably controls the result of wage bargaining by setting search and employment
subsidies BU and BL according to
BU − BL






Equation (B.2) relates to labour market participation. Participation will be optimal if
the value η of having an additional household member search for a job equals the expected
social return on search, µf². As is stated in the separate Mathematical Appendix, the
private participation decision must satisfy η = BU +fλ
L which equates the value of time
endowment with the expected private return on search which is the unemployment beneﬁt
plus the expected capital gain from ﬁnding a job with probability f.I n t h e a b s e n c e o f
taxes, the valuation of a job by households and ﬁrms is related by the bargaining condition
ζµL =( 1 − ζ)λ
L. Using this, the private and social returns of search are equated if
B
U + f · µ
Lζ/(1 − ζ)=µf². (30)
12There are two natural distortions again. First, private agents take the probability f as
given and ignore the fact that their own search activity reduces the chances of other
households to locate a job, but raises the chances of ﬁrms to ﬁll vacancies. In equilibrium,
the probability of ﬁnding a job is reduced with increased market participation. The
perceived private return on search is thus too high on this account, and should be lower
by a factor ². Second, the ﬁrms’ bargaining power squeezes wages below the workers’
marginal value product and thereby depresses the private return on search. According to
(30), the social and private rewards on search may be equated if ﬁscal policy succeeds to
control wage formation by means of an appropriate tax or subsidy on search. Replacing
µL by (28), rearranging, and using (B.3) on this result, we obtain:
B
U =( ² − ζ)
µf
1 − ζ






Proposition 1 The ﬁrst best social optimum is decentralized if the Hosios condition
holds, ² = ζ, employment and unemployment subsidies are zero, BU = BL =0 ,a n d
taxes on capital income are absent, tK =0 .
Note that wage taxes are not distorting if the Hosios (1990) condition holds which
states that the search equilibrium is eﬃcient if the bargaining power of workers is equal
to the matching elasticity relating to vacancies. These parameters result in a wage rate
that just internalizes the search externalities.
Proposition 2 If the Hosios condition fails and the matching elasticity is constant, the
social optimum is decentralized by tK = tL =0and BL and BU as in (29) and (31).
3 Integration and Unemployment
We analyze a stylized integration scenario that captures some essential aspects of Eastern
enlargement of the European Union from the viewpoint of present EU member states, say
13Germany. Integration reduces import prices in the EU but also creates export opportu-
nities as Central and Eastern European countries obtain better access to EU produced
commodities. The eﬀects of integration may partly be felt as an improvement of the
terms of trade vis-á-vis the entrants. As Baldwin et al. (1997) have argued, member-
ship may increase the growth prospects in applicant countries much more than in the EU
which should improve the terms of trade. On the negative side, ﬁnancing enlargement
will put a considerable ﬁscal burden on present member states. Finally, one of the most
controversial aspects of extending full membership is the free movement of labour. The
expected labour market eﬀects of immigration cause deep reservations against enlarge-
ment in present member states. Will it depress wages and increase unemployment among
domestic workers? We ﬁrst provide some analytical results.
3.1 Capital Intensity
Removing trade barriers squeezes domestic prices pm = 1 + τ for imports. Depending on
the import share γ, lower trade barriers favourably aﬀect the price index for the com-
posite good which is deﬁned as P =m i n
©
phch + pmcm s.t. C(ch,c m) ≥ 1
ª
. Indicating
percentage changes by a hat, ˆ ph = dph/ph, ˆ τ = dτ/(1 + τ), trade costs and output prices
feed into the price index as
ˆ P =( 1 − γ)ˆ p
h + γˆ τ. (32)
We use RK ≡
¡
1 − tK¢
phFK/P and RL ≡
¡
1 − tK¢
phFL/P as a short-hand for real
rental rates net of taxes. According to (14) and (18), RK = r +δ. Investment conditions
improve on two accounts: better terms of trade (i.e. higher output prices) and lower
import barriers. The capital labour ratio k = K/(L − κv) increases accordingly by11
ˆ k =
¡
ˆ ph − ˆ τ
¢
γσK/(1 − α). The net real rental rate of labour, in turn, increases along
11The elasticity of substitution in production is σK = −(1 − α)f0/(kf00) and capital’s share in value
added is α = kf0/f where f(k) denotes the production function in intensive form.
14with higher capital intensity:
ˆ R
L =ˆ p
h + ˆ FL − ˆ P =
¡
ˆ p
h − ˆ τ
¢
γ/(1 − α). (33)
3.2 Labour Market Tightness
The supply side is now solved quite simply in a recursive way. With the capital labour
ratio and, thus, the net rental price of labour ﬁxed once and for all, the wage equation
(23), the free entry condition (19) and the asset price equation (20) solve for the value
of a ﬁlled job µL, the labour market tightness θ, and the wage rate W independently of
the levels of employment and capital. This implies that the asset price instantaneously
jumps to its stationary value, ˙ µL =0at all dates.
The nature of the labour market equilibrium depends very much on the speciﬁc ﬁscal
policy rules in place. We emphasize three cases:12 (a) real beneﬁts BL and BU constant,
(b) indexation where BU = bU ¡
1 − tY¢
W and BL = bL ¡
1 − tY¢
W,a n d( c )p r o g r e s s i v e
wage taxation with unemployment beneﬁts indexed, BU = bU ¡
1 − tY¢
W,b u tr e a lt a x
allowance BL constant. One could argue that the tax allowance is indexed, if at all, to
ab r o a d e rd e ﬁnition of income than just net wages. Fiscal policy rules are important
since they aﬀect wage formation which determines producer rents and incentives to post
vacancies. Integration impacts on labour markets by raising the rental cost of labour,
(a) ˆ θ =
(1−ζ)(BU−BL)
[(r+β+s)²+ζf]µL ˆ RL, (b) ˆ θ =0 , (c) ˆ θ =
−(1−ζ)Ψ00BL
[(r+β+s)²+ζfΨ00]µL ˆ RL, (34)
where Ψ00 > 0 is deﬁn e di n( C . 1), see appendix C for details.
Proposition 3 The labour market eﬀects of integration depend on ﬁscal policy rules.
(a) Market tightness increases when unemployment beneﬁts BU and tax allowance BL are
k e p tc o n s t a n ti nr e a lt e r m s ,w i t hBU >B L.
(b) Market tightness remains constant when BU and BL are fully indexed to net wages.
12From now on, we restrict ourselves, for reasons of simplicity only, to a common marginal tax rate
tL = tK = tY . We continue to assume that the basic tax allowance applies only to wage income.
15(c) Market tightness falls when beneﬁts BU are indexed and the wage tax is progressive
with the tax allowance BL constant in real terms.
Being a weighted average of rental labour cost and workers’ reservation wages, net
wages increase less than in proportion to the rental rate RL if net unemployment ben-
eﬁts BU − BL are kept constant. Producer rents, and thus the asset price of a ﬁlled
job, accordingly increase more than proportionately. The fact that job values increase
relatively more than the opportunity costs of recruitment, ˆ µ
L > ˆ RL,b o o s t si n c e n t i v e s
to create vacancies. The labour market becomes tighter. The increase in market tight-
ness makes it easier to ﬁnd jobs and thereby raises workers’ reservation wages. Higher
wage demands and lower producer rents retard incentives to create vacancies whence the
increase in market tightness is eventually stopped at a higher equilibrium level. With
complete indexation as in case (b), net wages, producer rents and asset price of ﬁlled jobs
all increase proportionately. As the expected value of posting a vacancy increases by the
same amount as the ﬁrms’ search cost, there is no reason to revise recruitment. When
unemployment beneﬁts are indexed but the tax allowance, or working subsidy, is kept
constant, wages increase relatively more than rental costs, leave smaller producer rents,
and contribute to weaker market tightness.
3.3 Employment Dynamics
For the rest of this section, we conﬁne our discussion to case (a) of constant real beneﬁts.13
Cases (b) and (c) may be inferred by inspection. In raising labour market tightness θ,a
reduction of trade barriers and an improvement of the terms of trade reduces the length
of unemployment spells and thereby contributes to lower unemployment. While θ jumps
instantaneously to its steady state value, the reduction in unemployment is gradual as
in (11) with an adjustment speed equal to β + s + f. Since the vacancy ratio jumps up
13This case conforms best to the notion of wage rigidity. Being partly tied to constant beneﬁts, wages
ﬂuctuate less than the rental price of labour. Beneﬁt indexation, in contrast, implies full wage ﬂexibility
as it keeps the wedge between rental price and wage ﬁxed and makes them change proportionately.
16instantaneously, labour use in production, LD = L − κV , ﬁrst declines and picks up only
afterwards as ﬁrms build up their labour force. Taking the solution for the unemployment
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· ˆ θ, (35)
where χ ≡ (1 + κθ)(1 − ²)f − κθ(β + s + f). Employment in production thus follows
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With productive employment determined and the eﬀect on the capital labour ratio noted
prior to (33), we derive an output response
ˆ Y = ˆ L






h − ˆ τ
¢
> 0. (37)
The employment rate ﬁrst falls as ﬁrms allocate more of their labour force to recruitment
activities. Since the capital labour ratio picks up instantaneously, the output response is
ambiguous in the short-run.
3.4 Welfare
We report the change in welfare, based on the welfare measure given in (27), as an
annuitized ﬂow in percent of real GNP, ˆ Λ∗ ≡ r·dΛ∗




















where ˆ tE = tE/
¡
1 − tE¢
deﬁnes the relative change in the net contribution rate. The ex-
pression captures the major sources of the gains from integration: First, welfare improves
upon better terms of trade and lower real trade costs.14 Second, the home country directly
loses from a higher net contribution rate to the EU budget. Third, welfare potentially
improves upon more employment being allocated to production. And fourth, the country
gains from induced investment to the extent that it is suppressed initially by a distorting
14The simulation model also captures the loss in tariﬀ revenue that results from the Europe agreements.
17capital income tax.15 Note that, for any given capital labour ratio, investment must pick
up to accommodate employment gains, ˆ Kt = ˆ k + ˆ LD
t .
The potential welfare gains from induced employment are a more intricate matter.



















This reveals the wedges ζ − ² and BU − BL. If the bargaining power of workers exceeds
the matching elasticity with respect to searchers, bargaining results in too high wages,
insuﬃcient job creation and, consequently, excessive unemployment. Unemployment ben-
eﬁts further exacerbate the problem since they also boost wages and retard job creation.
Indeed, Proposition 2 implies that excessive bargaining power should be addressed with
taxes on unemployed rather than beneﬁts to discipline wage demands. Under these cir-
cumstances, any shock that stimulates employment promises ﬁrst order welfare gains.
Proposition 4 Welfare gains from induced employment increase with net unemployment
beneﬁts and the workers’ bargaining power relative to the matching elasticity.
3.5 Immigration
We consider two scenarios. Assuming a ﬁxed world population and location choice re-
stricted to newborns only, a permanently larger share of newborns worldwide locate in
the home country. Thus, the number Nt,t of new arrivals is permanently higher and leads
to a gradual increase in the domestic population according to ˙ Nt = Nt,t − βNt until the
stock converges to N = Nt,t/β. There will be long-lasting transitional eﬀects on aggregate
labour supply. As an alternative scenario, we assume that immigration augments all age
cohorts by the same factor which precludes any transitional eﬀects on the demographic
15The simulation model allows for monopolistic competition and markup pricing of specialized capital
goods. For this reason, capital accumulation is too low in equilibrium, and investment stimulation yields
ﬁrst order welfare gains even without tax distortions.
18structure. In this subsection we conﬁne to this stock approach and develop some ana-
lytical results. The simulation section will compare the transitional eﬀects of the two
scenarios. In all cases, we assume that migrants arrive bare of any ﬁnancial assets.
In the small open economy, the capital labour ratio depends exclusively on real inter-
est and prices as ﬁxed on international markets. Factor rentals thus remain constant and
wage formation is not disturbed. According to (34), immigration does not aﬀect labour
market tightness. With the stock approach to immigration, the number of newborns,
Nt,t = βNt, increases in line with the overall population which splits between employed
a n du n e m p l o y e da g e n t s ,N = L + U. According to (11), the number of unemployed
converges to U = N (β + s)/(β + s + f), leaving the long-run unemployment rate U/N
unaﬀected. Immigration increases the number of employed and unemployed agents, the
number of vacancies, labour input in production, capital stock and output all proportion-
ately without eﬀect on the capital-labour and vacancy-unemployment ratios. Immigration
holds important transitional eﬀects, however, since migrants ﬁnd work only via search in
the labour market. With L0 being predetermined, immigration raises the number of job
searchers instantaneously by dU0 = dN giving ˆ U0 = ˆ N/U and a short-run overshooting
o ft h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eo fˆ U0 − ˆ N = ˆ N (1 − U)/U.
These arguments miss out on a basic channel that works to reduce unemployment.
The simulation model features a monopolistically competitive production sector with
product diﬀerentiation due to free entry of specialized ﬁrms. As immigration swells the
labour force and induces investment to keep capital intensity constant, output expands
proportionately, at least in the long-run. With the scale of individual ﬁrms ﬁxed, output
comes in the form of additional product varieties giving rise to increasing returns due to
specialization. The variety eﬀect reduces the price index for the composite capital good
which raises capital intensity and the rental rate of labour. If unemployment beneﬁts are
kept constant in real terms, labour market tightness increases and unemployment falls.16
16W h i l ew es t r e s st h eb a s ec a s e( a )o fc o n s t a n tb e n e ﬁts, cases (b) and (c) discussed in section 3.2
relating to ﬁscal policy rules apply to immigration as well.
19Proposition 5 In the small open economy, immigration does not aﬀect the capital labour
and vacancy unemployment ratios. Immigration raises short-run unemployment but leaves
the long-run unemployment rate unaﬀected. If production is subject to increasing re-
turns due to specialization, the output gains from immigration boost investment and labour
rentals and thereby reduce long-run unemployment rates if real beneﬁts are kept constant.
4 Eastern Enlargement of the EU
The stylized model leaves open many questions that we now investigate with the help of
a CGE model of the German economy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
multisectoral CGE model combining savings and investment with search unemployment
in segmented markets for high and low skilled labour. Appendix E describes the most
important elements of the model and its calibration.
4.1 The Scenario
The EU presently negotiates with ﬁve Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC5s):
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia. At some point, membership may
be extended to all ten CEEC10s including Romania and Bulgaria. Germany is more ex-
posed to potential entrants from the East than most other present EU member countries.
The share of CEECs in 1996 German merchandise exports is 6.6 percent, up from 1.59
percent in 1989, while merchandise imports amount to 6.3 percent. By way of contrast, in
countries like France or Spain, the 1996 shares are less than 2 percent. Only for Austria
is trade with CEECs equally important. Given the large number of ethnic Germans still
living in Poland and other CEECs, the immigration pressure poses another threat to the
German labour market, on top of East West migration within Germany.
We brieﬂy describe the speciﬁc policy scenario to be evaluated but refer to Baldwin et
al. (1997) and Keuschnigg et al. (2000) for a more elabourate discussion. We include the
Europe Agreements as part of the overall scenario because they are understood as a ﬁrst
20step towards full membership. They extend to all CEEC10s and enact a bilateral tariﬀ
liberalization in non-agricultural sectors. The agreements hold a somewhat more powerful
stimulus on the export side which tends to favour an increase in domestic equilibrium
prices. Tariﬀs on German exports to CEEC5s amount to 6.7% on average, and those
to the rest of the CEEC10s 11%. In contrast, EU tariﬀs on imports to Germany are
more moderate at 6.3%, or 7.6% from the rest of the CEEC10s. These tariﬀ cuts involve
considerable sectoral variation with agriculture, textiles and food being the most protected
sectors. Equally important, full EU membership extends internal market access which
involves both a complete removal of all remaining (agricultural) tariﬀs on east-west trade
a n dav a r i e t yo fn o n - t a r i ﬀ barriers. Baldwin et al. (1997) stipulate a reduction of real trade
costs in the amount of 10 percent uniform across all sectors. We are more conservative
in assuming that the savings in real resource use for cross border transactions is only 5
percent on average for CEEC5s. Enlargement also holds a special negative demand shock
for EU farmers. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) implies that eastern farmers will
come under the protective umbrella aﬀorded by the EU price support system.17 Relying
on an estimate of Anderson and Tyers (1995), the increase in productivity and agricultural
output in CEECs is assumed to reduce world farm prices by 2 percent. Our scenario holds
that the EU will not raise its variable import levies and export subsidies to protect its
farmers against this erosion of world market prices.
Apart from being a key issue in the popular debate, the ﬁscal cost of enlargement
is also a dominant factor in determining the magnitude of the simulation results. Our
scenario implements ﬁnancial projections by the European Commission in the Agenda
2000. The net cost of enlargement to CEEC5s is Euro 10.48 Billion or .113 percent of
EU15 GNP. Taking account of contributions and return ﬂows, we arrive at an increase
in Germany’s net contribution to the EU from .595% to .645% of GDP. Finally, EU
membership guarantees free movement of labour. Germany already attracts most of
the immigrants from CEECs, many of them with ethnic German origin. Naturally, the
expectation of further immigration and the implications for wages and unemployment,
17Keuschnigg et al. (2000) and Anderson and Tyers (1995) oﬀer more detail on CAP eﬀects.
21in particular among the low skilled, leave many Germans severely worried. We assume
further immigration of 2.5 percent of the total labour force, or roughly one million in
the long-run. In the light of recent experience in Germany, this number seems an upper
bound.18 In one scenario, we will assume that immigration is concentrated among low-
skilled workers. Since only about 17 percent of the workforce is classiﬁed as low-skilled
in our data, the unskilled labour force would then expand by 15p e r c e n ta p p r o x i m a t e l y .
4.2 Quantitative Results
Since the simulation model endogenizes the terms of trade by means of downward sloping
export demand functions, the overall scenario becomes ambiguous a priori. The abolition
of trade barriers tends to expand the economy while higher net transfers to the EU are
contractionary [see Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996)]. Our results indicate that the mutual
trade liberalization and improved market access clearly dominates the picture. The supply
and demand reactions following enlargement are easily pointed out. Despite of the more
complex economic structure, the numerical results reported in Table 1 largely conﬁrm
the basic insights of the analytical sections. We start in some detail with the base case
scenario of column (1), keeping real beneﬁts and tax allowance constant.
Real Beneﬁts Constant: Cheaper capital and intermediate goods improve supply
conditions. Home producer prices get under pressure with buyers favouring imports of
eastern origin. The mutual elimination of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers creates vigorous
export and import growth in trade with CEECs. The scenario, however, holds a slightly
more powerful leverage on the export side since the CEECs had noticeably higher tariﬀs
at the outset than the EU. German exports to CEECs expand by about 57%, creating
excess demand for home goods. To restore equilibrium, domestic producer prices increase
on average although the eﬀect is rather small compared to the reduction in price indices on
18De New and Zimmermann (1999) and Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1999) discuss the German experience
with trade and immigration. Quaisser et al.(2000, pp.117) review estimates of migration potentials.
22account of lower protection rates.19 Higher prices choke oﬀ demand for home goods and
at the same time reinforce the supply side expansion by strengthening incentives to invest.
The economy experiences an investment led expansion with capital stocks accumulating
by .64%. The increase in capital intensity strengthens marginal rents to job creation
and tightens labour markets, leading to a small reduction in unemployment in the base
case where real unemployment beneﬁts are kept constant [column (1)o fT a b l e1]. The
reduction in the unemployment rate is slightly larger for unskilled workers, although the
initial rate is much higher for them. With a total labour force of 40 million in Germany,
the reduction in the average unemployment rate creates about 28.000 new jobs. While
the gains in employment are relatively minor, workers beneﬁt from higher wages. Wages
of skilled workers, deﬂated by the consumer price index, are up by .92% in real terms.
Integration contributes to a slightly wider wage spread.20
The output expansion largely occurs via ﬁrm entry and thus contributes to produc-
tivity gains due to specialization and diversiﬁcation of industrial production. Such pro-
ductivity gains translate into lower price indices which further stimulate investment and
other ﬁnal demand, thereby magnifying the gains in output and real income. Real GDP,
deﬂated by the consumer price index, is up by .7%. It is assumed that the government
passes on the ﬁscal burden of enlargement to households by cutting transfer payments. On
the other hand, the overall expansion considerably swells the tax bases which, for given
rates, boosts revenues from both direct and indirect taxes. This revenue eﬀect allows in
the end for a remarkable increase in transfers to households other than unemployment
beneﬁts (.62%, or .92% in real terms). The ﬁscal returns from enlargement are, thus,
more than enough to pay for the increase in net contributions. Wage growth, lower un-
employment and higher transfers all boost average disposable wage income which is up
19The large terms of trade gains vis-á-vis the CEEC5s (7%) are due to the fact that vanishing trade
costs are direct equivalents to a terms of trade improvement. Since cheaper imports reﬂect savings in
resource use on the part of eastern suppliers, there is no oﬀsetting terms-of-trade loss for the east!
20The eﬀect on the wage spread is understood only by investigating in more detail the structural eﬀects
of enlargement, see Keuschnigg et al. (2000).
23by .89% in real terms and must exactly correspond to the increase in consumption in the
long-run. The aggregate welfare gain amounts to almost half a percent of GDP.21
Alternative Fiscal Policy Assumptions: We now address the alternative cases dis-
cussed in Proposition 3. Column (2) of Table 1 refers to the case where both unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and basic tax allowance are indexed to net of tax wages. In this case, wages
are fully ﬂexible and integration remains without consequences for labour market tight-
ness and unemployment. The diﬀerence in the other macroeconomic variables is hardly
discernible. The exception is government transfers which are roughly half the size since
indexation requires to increase unemployment beneﬁts in face of higher wages. For this
reason, the gains in average disposable wage income and aggregate consumption are some-
what lower. The welfare gain is eroded as well since the shock is now less expansionary
which tends to subdue the gains from specialization and induced capital accumulation.
Column (3) turns to a more progressive wage tax with higher marginal tax rates which
combine with a larger personal allowance to replicate the data on tax revenues. Unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are indexed but the real value of the basic tax allowance is kept constant.
As shown in Proposition 3, the unemployment rates (slightly) increase. Column (4) again
turns to the base case scenario where beneﬁts and tax allowance are kept constant in real
terms. In addition, we now keep constant real household sector transfers as well (which
decline along with the consumer price index by -.32%) and, instead, adjust the wage tax
to ﬁnance the government budget. The expansionary nature of EU enlargement swells
the tax bases and yields a considerable ﬁscal dividend which allows for a reduction in the
marginal wage tax rate by about one percentage point. The lower tax burden on labour
reinforces the eﬀects of integration and further squeezes unemployment. Compared to the
base case scenario in the ﬁrst column of Table 1, the reduction in the unemployment rate
is now more than double, creating employment for about 63000 people.
21We compute the equivalent variations of life-time wealth for each cohort and sum them over present
and future generations with due discounting and weighing by cohort size. For comparison with annual
GDP, we convert the resulting wealth measure into an annuity by multiplying with the interest rate.
24Immigration: One of the Union’s basic principles is free movement of labour. If Eastern
Europeans seize the opportunity to migrate to the richer Western part of the enlarged
union, in search of higher real wages and better public services, Germany is expected to
attract a considerable wave of immigration. There is disagreement about the magnitude of
the migration potential and the Union’s policy response to it. We thus compute the eﬀects
of immigration separately from the other elements of enlargement. Immigration amounts
to 2.5 percent of the labour force, or 15 percent of unskilled workers. In column (5) of Table
1, immigration adds proportionally to both skill groups while in column (6) it is entirely
concentrated among the low-skilled.22 The eﬀects reported in column (5) are anticipated in
P r o p o s i t i o n5 .I na no p e ne c o n o m yw i t hac o n s t a n tr e a li n t e r e s tr a t e ,i m m i g r a t i o nd o e s n ’ t
hold any direct incentives to adjust capital intensity. The increase in manpower is largely
accommodated by investment to hold the capital labour ratio constant. Consequently,
immigration translates into an equally large output expansion. In the presence of a
monopolistically competitive market structure with endogenous diversiﬁcation, however,
the output gains come in the form of increased ﬁrm entry resulting in more specialized
production techniques. The gains from diversiﬁcation squeeze price indices which makes
investment goods cheaper and contributes to higher capital intensity and labour rentals.
With constant real beneﬁts, higher labour rentals increase job values by more than wages,
encouraging ﬁrms to post more vacancies. Tightening labour markets eventually reduce
unemployment rates in both skill groups. Due to the size of the shock, the eﬀect is much
stronger than in the base scenario of column (1). The welfare gains relate only to the
domestic population and are worth one and a half percent of GDP.
Finally, column (6) points to strong distributional eﬀects when immigration is concen-
trated among the low-skilled. The unemployment rate among them picks up by roughly
one and a half percentage points to 11.4% while real wages decline by almost 9.5%! Skilled
workers, in contrast, beneﬁt from wage increases amounting to 2.9% in real terms, while
22One may doubt that immigrants from CEEC5s are low-skilled. One could argue that despite of gen-
erally high education levels, these skills are largely inappropriate for Germany’s technologically advanced
production techniques, or at least require considerable retraining.
25their unemployment rate at the same time falls by two tenths of a percentage point. Most
of the shock thus translates into wages rather than (un-)employment. Even though the
number of migrants is the same, the welfare gain is considerably lower if immigration is
concentrated among the low-skilled only. Figures 1a-b compare the transitional eﬀects
on group speciﬁc unemployment rates under two alternative scenarios, the stock and ﬂow
approaches discussed in section 3.5. Immigration is concentrated among the low-skilled
as in column (6) of Table 1.T h e ﬂow approach assumes a permanently higher arrival
rate of new generations at home. The resulting adjustment process is smooth but extends
over several decades until the stationary demographics is attained. The stock approach,
in contrast, assumes that immigration inﬂates all age cohorts proportionally without any
extended demographic eﬀects. Since all migrants ﬁnd employment only by searching in
the (low-skilled) labour market, the unemployment rate shoots up instantaneously to
more than double its initial value. Due to the very fast labour market dynamics, however,
the long-run unemployment rate of about 11.4% is approximately attained within a few
quarters! Figure 2 shows how the slow demographic dynamics translates into extended
adjustment of aggregate savings and foreign debt [percent change from initial values].
Debt adjustment takes much longer under the ﬂow approach where population grows over
an extended period to attain a stationary level only later on. Note also that net foreign
assets ﬁrst decline because rising wage proﬁles weaken savings incentives of early genera-
tions. The trend gets reversed when wage growth slows at a higher level and full savings
incentives of future generations are restored again.
Sensitivity: Unfortunately, some key behavioural parameters that may importantly de-
termine the quantitative results of CGE analysis, are not always precisely estimated in the
econometrics literature. This necessitates a sensitivity analysis to gauge a plausible range
of results. It is particularly diﬃcult to ﬁnd reliable values for the bargaining power of
workers, making ζ a prime candidate for sensitivity analysis. In Table 2, we recompute the
results for values of ζ ∈ {.3,.5,.7} where the bold faced entries in the ﬁrst line reproduce
the base case in column (1)o fT a b l e1.T h eﬁrst entry in each two cells relating to the
26same value of bargaining power reports the long-run unemployment rate of high-skilled
workers, and the second the change in the aggregate welfare measure. In all cases, real
unemployment beneﬁts and the real tax allowance are kept constant. Surprisingly, as bar-
gaining power of workers increases the reduction in high skilled unemployment becomes
larger. A variation in this parameter, however, is quantitatively rather unimportant in
determining how unemployment rates respond to integration. Also, the eﬀect of raising
the matching elasticity ² relating to job searchers from .4 to .5 is without much impact.
The reduction of the unemployment rate is slightly smaller for a higher elasticity. Inter-
estingly, unemployment rates are much more sensitive to other parameters that determine
the magnitude of the response of trade ﬂows, investment and domestic output. The Arm-
ington trade elasticities vary across sectors between 2.7 and 5.3 initially. Scaling them
up by a factor of 1.3 in the third line of Table 2, e.g. from 4 to 5.2, contributes to a
more pronounced reduction in unemployment. Even more important is the magnitude of
markup m which is related to the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated brands
of each sectoral good according to m = σ/(σ − 1). Markups vary between 1.06 to 1.43
with an output weighted average of 1.15. We double the average markup giving an overall
price cost margin of almost 1.3 and, accordingly, scale down the substitution elasticities.
The productivity gains from ﬁrm entry are now much stronger and vigorously reinforce
the macroeconomic response to integration. According to the last line of Table 2, the
unemployment rate of the high skilled would then decline to about 5.86%.
In line with Proposition 4, the welfare gains from integration increase with workers’
bargaining power but the eﬀect is moderate simply because the induced employment
eﬀects are small. Only when markups and the returns to specialization are larger, does
bargaining power make a larger diﬀerence for the welfare gains from integration. More
powerful specialization eﬀects and a higher Armington elasticity work to magnify the
investment and unemployment response and, thus, propel the welfare gains from induced
employment, capital accumulation, and terms of trade improvement.
275C o n c l u s i o n s
Based on a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, search un-
employment and capital accumulation, this paper studied the labour market and general
equilibrium eﬀects of integration and immigration. The model is the ﬁrst of its kind
and was applied to an analysis of Eastern EU enlargement. We found that the eﬀects of
i n t e g r a t i o nd e p e n do nt h eﬁscal policy rules in place as they relate to unemployment com-
pensation and wage taxation. Our base case scenario keeps unemployment beneﬁts and
the wage tax allowance constant in real terms which installs some degree of wage rigid-
ity. In raising capital intensity, integration boosts the marginal productivity of labour.
With constant beneﬁts, job values increase by more than wages, leading ﬁrms to post
more vacancies. Labour market tightness increases and unemployment declines. If the
economy suﬀers from excessive bargaining power of workers or is stuck with high unem-
ployment beneﬁts, resulting in high wages and unemployment, then integration yields
further welfare gains, apart from the traditional ones, by stimulating employment.
We also found that the expansionary eﬀects of enlargement yield a remarkable ﬁscal
dividend that could be used to cut the wage tax rate, despite of the need to ﬁnance higher
net contributions to the EU. This considerably reinforces the reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate. Immigration that augments all skill types proportionally, does not directly
aﬀect long-run unemployment. Any transitional increase in unemployment disappears
rather rapidly due to the fast labour market turnover. However, if the expansion of ag-
gregate output in response to immigration results in ﬁrm entry and productivity gains
from increasing diversiﬁcation and specialization, the ensuing investment boom raises cap-
ital intensity and squeezes long-run unemployment. If immigration is concentrated among
the low-skilled, both their wages and employment prospects are directly impaired while
the high-skilled gain on both accounts. We found the quantitative eﬀect of integration to
be modest compared to the labour market eﬀects of immigration.
28Appendix:
A Shadow Prices and Human Capital: Equation (8) deﬁnes the diﬀerential value
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The value of searching equals the present value of the unemployment beneﬁtp l u st h e
expected gain of locating a valuable job, using the annuity rate of interest for discounting.
Our shadow prices are uniquely related to the asset prices of employed and unemployed
states as usually deﬁn e di nt h es e a r c hl i t e r a t u r e ,vU ≡ λ
U and vL ≡ λ
U +λ
L.U s i n gt h e s e



















The Mathematical Appendix shows that human wealth can be written in terms of
shadow prices, i.e. Hv,t = λ
L
t Lv,t + λ
U
t . Aggregate human wealth is, thus,
Ht = λ
L
t Lt + λ
U
t Nt. (A.4)
Using the appropriate diﬀerential equations, the time derivative is ˙ Ht = λ
U
t Nt,t + rHt −
W ∗
t Lt−BU
t Ut. Since new dynasties are born without a job, their human wealth is equal to
the value of searching, i.e. Ht,t = λ
U
t . The same equation is derived by time diﬀerentiating
(9) and explicitly aggregating the result.
B Social Optimum: The socially optimal allocation maximizes (27) subject to (15),
(22) and the labour constraint N = L+U. The Hamiltonian H = phF (K,L− κV )/P −
(r + δ)K +µ[Vq(V/U) − (β + s)L]+η[N − L − U] yields optimality conditions for the
29controls K, U,a n dV , and a costate equation for the stock L:
p
h
tFK/Pt = r + δ, (B.1)
ηt = µtf (θt)², (B.2)





tFL/Pt − ηt =( r + β + s)µt − ˙ µt, (B.4)
where the shadow prices µ and η relate to the employment stock and the time constraint.
To make sure that the social and private job values satisfy (28), we multiply (B.4) by









²θκ/(1 − ²) to
rewrite the social job rent. After substituting (19) for µL, (23) replaces W to rewrite the
private job rent. Some rearranging gives (29).
C Labour Market Tightness: The ﬁscal policy rules noted in section 3.2 give rise to





















ζRL − (1 − ζ)BL + ζfµL¤
Ψ00, Ψ00 ≡ 1
1−bU(1−ζ).
(C.1)
The asset price capitalizes net producer rents according to the stationary version of (20),
(r + β + s)µL = RL −
¡
1 − tY¢
W. Substituting (C.1) yields:
(a)[ r + β + s + ζf (θ)]µL =( 1 − ζ)
¡
RL + BL − BU¢
,
(b)[ r + β + s + ζf (θ)Ψ0]µL =( 1 − ζΨ0)RL,
(c)[ r + β + s + ζf (θ)Ψ00]µL =( 1 − ζΨ00)RL +( 1 − ζ)Ψ00BL.
(C.2)
Equation (C.2) together with the free entry condition (19), µLq = κRL, simultaneously
determine the vacancy ratio, or labour market tightness, and the asset price. Log-
linearization of (C.2a) yields (r + β + s + ζf)µLˆ µ
L+ζµLf ˆ f =( 1 − ζ)RL ˆ RL.E x p a n da n d
use (C.2a) to obtain (r + β + s + ζf)µL
³
ˆ µ
L − ˆ RL
´
+ ζµLf ˆ f =( 1 − ζ)
¡
BU − BL¢ ˆ RL.
30Using ˆ f =( 1 − ²)ˆ θ from (22), and the diﬀerential of (19), ˆ µ
L − ˆ RL = ²ˆ θ, gives the equi-
librium eﬀect of integration on labour market tightness in (34). Cases (b) and (c) are
derived the same way.
D Unemployment and Welfare: With a constant population of size one, the mass
of labour market entrants is Nt,t = βNt = β, unemployment dynamics in (11)i s ˙ Ut =
β + s − [β + s + f (θt)]Ut with U∞ =
β+s
β+s+f(θ). Log-linearization yields an analytical
solution in terms of deviations from the initial equilibrium. The relative change in the
length of the unemployment spell is ˆ f =( 1 − ²)ˆ θ, implying:
·
ˆ Ut = −(1 − ²)f ˆ θ − (β + s + f) ˆ Ut, (D.1)
where ˆ U ≡ dU/U and
·
ˆ U ≡ d ˙ U/U. Starting with ˆ U0 =0and noting ˆ θ from (34), the
transitional solution is:




, ˆ U∞ = −
(1 − ²)f
β + s + f
ˆ θ. (D.2)
Since recruitment absorbs part of the labour force, employment in production is only
LD = L − κV and changes according to ˆ LD
t = −
h
(1 + κθ) ˆ Ut + κθˆ θ
i
U/LD.
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Using (14) together with (18) and (32), we obtain (38). To compute the welfare gains
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r + β + s + f
ˆ θ. (D.4)
Divide (C.2a) by RL,u s eµLq = κRL from (19) and multiply by f = θq to get (r + β + s)κθ+
ζfκθ =( 1 − ζ)f − (1 − ζ)f BU−BL
RL . Using this and the deﬁnition of χ in (35) to replace
the square bracket in (D.4), and get (39).
31E The Computational Model: This paper diﬀers from Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996,
2000) by allowing for search unemployment but shares other model elements. We repeat
only the most important features that add to the core elements introduced in section 2 and
refer to these authors for a more detailed presentation of the other aspects. Production
occurs in twelve sectors that are connected by interindustry shipments of intermediate
goods. Free entry subject to a zero proﬁt condition determines the equilibrium number
of ﬁrms and diﬀerentiated goods within each sector, giving rise to increasing returns due
to specialization. Demand stems from Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) preferences, i.e. diﬀerent
brands are imperfectly substitutable. The composition of investment, government and
export demand similarly reﬂects allocation of expenditure across diﬀerentiated, sectoral
commodities. Demand is regionally diﬀerentiated with imports coming from CEECs, the
rest of the EU and the rest of the world. On the supply side, investment is subject to
installation costs, making transitional dynamics more realistic. Employment and capital
stocks are accumulated separately in each sector. Labour supply and demand distinguish
high and low skilled labour with job matching taking place in two segmented markets.
Sectoral export demand functions for each regional destination make the country large in
output markets and endogenize domestic prices, i.e. the terms of trade relative to given
foreign producer prices. The domestic real interest rate reﬂects changes in terms of trade
over time but is otherwise tied to a constant rate determined on world capital markets.
The model is calibrated to 1996 benchmark data of the German economy. We select
certain taste and technology parameters from the econometrics literature and also draw
on parameters commonly used in the real business cycle literature [see Andolfatto (1996),
Burda and Weder (1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) etc.]. Other parameters are
calibrated such that the stationary solution reproduces the benchmark data set. The
model is implemented quarterly to get meaningful lengths of unemployment spells. In the
stationary state, unemployment rates of high and low skilled workers are set at 6 and 10
percent, respectively. Unemployment beneﬁts amount to 70 percent of net wages. The
bargaining power ζ is set at .5 for both skill types, and the matching elasticity ² with
respect to the unemployed at .4 [see Broersma and Van Ours (1999) for a survey]. In line
32with the empirical search literature, and drawing on German evidence by Schmidt (1999),
we set the transition rates such that average unemployment duration 1/f of high (low)
skilled labour is 1.75 (3) quarters. Vacancy duration 1/q is 1.4 (1.3) quarters. Together
with a quarterly mortality rate of β = 1/60,23 these values then imply a quarterly split rate
s to replicate the labour market equilibrium. The calibrated value implies a job duration
of about 27 quarters for both skill types. Calibration generates a search coeﬃcient κ
such that roughly two (three) percent of the skilled (unskilled) labour force is absorbed
in recruitment. Calibration of the rest of the model is standard and not repeated.
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35Table 1: Long-Run Eﬀects of EU Enlargement
Variables, changes in percent *) (1)( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
P consumer price index -0.301 -0.290 -0.296 -0.315 -0.456 -0.155
PI investment price index -0.152 -0.140 -0.140 -0.168 -0.482 -0.260
¯ p dom. producer prices 0.047 0.050 0.047 0.045 -0.046 0.115
¯ pE terms of trade with CEECs 7.143 7.151 7.151 7.134 -0.244 -0.210
EE exports to CEECs 57.309 57.197 57.205 57.449 2.841 2.411
E total exports 3.962 3.891 3.897 4.050 2.711 2.114
Us unempl.rate, skilled (6)*) 5.935 6.000 6.016 5.853 5.897 5.805
Uu unempl.rate, unsk. (10)*) 9.903 10.000 10.028 9.778 9.848 11.436
U unempl.rate, av. (6.668)*) 6.598 6.668 6.686 6.509 6.558 6.861
K
P
j capital stocks 0.636 0.545 0.559 0.750 4.045 3.078
¯ n number of ﬁrms 0.665 0.582 0.597 0.769 3.665 2.758
Y gross domestic production 0.392 0.329 0.339 0.472 2.873 2.280
ws wage rate, skilled 0.616 0.607 0.646 0.626 1.001 2.723
wu wage rate, unskilled 0.555 0.589 0.647 0.508 0.894 -9.509
z government transfers 0.621 0.342 0.568 -0.3157 . 2 5 1 5.409
ω average disposable income 0.593 0.479 0.499 0.739 5.267 4.100
C average consumption 0.896 0.771 0.797 1.051 5.750 4.265
EV aggr.welfare, % of GDP 0.476 0.411 0.421 0.553 1.5611 .125
Notes: (1): Real unemployment beneﬁts BU and real tax allowance BL constant. (2):
BU and BL both indexed. (3): BU indexed, real BL constant. (4): Real BU, BL and z
constant, wage tax rate endogenous. (5): Proportional immigration. (6): Immigration of
low-skilled labour. A bar (e.g. ¯ p) denotes weighted averages of sectoral values. *) Labour
market variables in absolute terms, initial values in brackets.
36Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
Bargaining power ζ = .3 ζ = .5 ζ = .7
Base case 5.938 0.450 5.935 0.476 5.933 0.488
Matching elasticity 5.950 0.427 5.947 0.458 5.945 0.472
Armington elasticity 5.892 0.944 5.885 1.001 5.882 1.028
Markup 5.874 1.179 5.8611 .307 5.854 1.370
Notes: In each column, ﬁrst entry reports unemployment rate of high
skilled and second entry aggregate welfare in percent of GDP. Match-
ing elasticity ε reset from .4 to .5. Armington trade elasticities scaled
by 1.3. Markups doubled from .15t o. 3o na v e r a g e .
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